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Criminal Law. State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321 (R.I. 1997). Absent
an offer of proof by defense counsel, the supreme court finds no
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's ruling limiting that attor-
ney's further cross-examination of a witness.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 11, 1990, three men shot into a car stopped in traf-
fic on Eddy Street in Providence, Rhode Island. The car contained
six passengers. As a result of that shooting, one passenger, Willie
Davis, died. One shot hit passenger Rodney Perry in the shoulder.
John Norman, Kimani Morris, Mark Ellis and Ronald Nelson were
the remaining passengers.' Alexis and Jose Doctor (Alexis and
Jose or the defendants) were two of the gunmen. The third alleged
gunman was a juvenile, Douglas "Junior."2 This was the third jury
trial for Alexis and Jose.3
At that third trial, three of the passengers were witnesses for
the State. They were Norman, Nelson and Ellis. By this time,
Kimani Morris had died.4 Norman testified that the surrounding
street lights illuminated the shooting location. He identified the
gunmen as the defendants, and Junior.5 He recognized the
gunmen because he had known Alexis and Jose for several years.
Norman had known Junior for about one year.8 Norman described
the fusillade. The gunmen began shooting into the vehicle. This
continued for about five minutes. Then the three gunmen ran be-
hind a nearby night club. At that time, Norman noticed that Davis
1. See State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 323 (R.I. 1997) (Doctor II).
2. See id. The supreme court reversed Junior's conviction in family court on
two counts of assault with intent to murder for improper restriction of cross-exami-
nation for bias or motive. See In re Douglas L., 625 A.2d 1357 (R.I. 1993).
3. The first trial began in February of 1992. The court declared a mistrial
when a State witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury.
See Doctor 11, 690 A.2d at 323. The second trial, which began in March of 1992,
resulted in convictions. However, the supreme court reversed those convictions
because the trial judge improperly restricted the scope of defense counsel's cross-
examination of a trial witness. See State v. Doctor, 644 A.2d 1286 (R.I. 1994) (Doc-
tor I).
4. See Doctor 1I, 690 A.2d at 326.
5. See id. at 323-24.
6. See id. at 324.
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and Perry were shot. He accompanied them to Rhode Island
Hospital.7
The State called another passenger in the car, Nelson, to tes-
tify. He was not a cooperative witness.8 He testified that he did
not know the identity of the gunmen. Nelson explained that his
prior statements to Providence Police officers, his previous identifi-
cation of Jose and Alexis and a prior statement given at the
Alexis's family court waiver hearing, were all incorrect. 9
A third passenger, Ellis, also testified. He testified that on the
night of the shooting, he had been drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana, and he had taken mescaline. 10 Ellis stated that he
could not see who shot into the car nor did he see Alexis or Jose
Doctor. He did see, however, that the gunmen were wearing large
hooded sweatshirts covering their faces."
The State also called Willie Davis's aunt, Vicky Brown Strong
(Strong), as a witness.12 Strong had been socializing outside of a
house on Rhodes Street in Providence, Rhode Island, on the night
of the shooting. She drank two wine coolers and had smoked mari-
juana. However, she claimed that this had not affected her recol-
lection. She was still "very positive" about that night's events. 13
Strong testified that when she arrived outside the Rhodes
Street address, Alexis was there. Shortly thereafter, Jose and Jun-
ior arrived independently. 14 Alexis, Jose and Junior showed each
other their guns. Then, the three men left together in Junior's car.
Strong heard Alexis say to Jose and Junior, "[l]et's go do this."15
Strong further testified that about forty-five minutes later,
Alexis and Jose returned to the Rhodes Street address. Junior was
not with them. They ran out of Junior's car and into Jose's car.
Strong said that Jose was running "like he was scared to death."' 6
Alexis was jumping up in the air, with his gun in hand, hollering. 17
7. See id.
8. See id. at 325.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 324.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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Later that evening, Strong discovered that her nephew, Willie
Davis, was shot. She went to Rhode Island Hospital with her
daughter. She did not give a statement to police at that time. In
fact, Strong reported, police had harassed her and pushed her
away. 18
Strong explained that she did not testify in the first two trials
because she had not given a statement to police. 19 She also ex-
plained that her boyfriend was a truck driver, and she was out of
town frequently with him during the earlier proceedings.20 How-
ever, Strong had testified at a family court hearing involving
Alexis. At about the time of the second trial, she had also spoken
to a Department of Children, Youth and Families' officer.21
In order to impeach Strong, the defense called a Providence
Police sergeant, Keith Tucker (Tucker).22 Tucker was assigned to
internal affairs. He testified that he had no record of Strong filing
a complaint relating to Davis's murder. Tucker also testified that
Strong had filed no report alleging hostile treatment from the po-
lice at Rhode Island Hospital.23
Both Alexis and Junior testified in their own defense. Jose
testified that he had been outside the Rhodes Street house until
about eight or nine p.m., at which time he went to a McDonald's
restaurant. Then he went to a night club on Eddy Street, in Provi-
dence, where he had a beer. He went home to bed about a half-
hour to forty-five minutes later.24 Alexis also admitted that he was
present outside the Rhodes Street house. Alexis left there about
seven p.m. to visit friends on Laura Street in Providence. At ten
p.m., he went home. Alexis believed that his brother, Jose, was
already home. However, Jose's room, which was in the basement,
had a separate entrance. Jose could enter and leave without trav-
eling through the main part of their house. 25
The jury found Alexis and Jose guilty on charges of murder,
conspiracy and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon.26
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 325-26.
25. See id. at 326.
26. See id. at 323.
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Alexis and Jose raised two claims of error on appeal. The first
claim was that the trial judge erred in prohibiting the defense from
pursuing its cross-examination of Strong on bias.27 The second
claim was that the trial judge should have granted the defendants'
motion for a new trial because Norman recanted his previous trial
testimony.28 The supreme court upheld the trial judge's denial of
the motion for a new trial because the trial judge had concluded
Norman's new testimony was a "perjurious attempt to help the de-
fendants get away with murder."29
This survey piece will concentrate on the issue of cross-exami-
nation on bias. The defense wanted to pursue its cross-examina-
tion of Strong on the issue of bias and motive for testifying as she
did.30
BACKGROUND
"The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation guarantees an accused the right to an effective cross-
examination in all criminal matters."31 Cross-examination is the
principal means of testing the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulness of his testimony.3 2 The Rhode Island Constitution
also guarantees a defendant's right to cross-examination. 33
The art of cross-examination provides counsel with the oppor-
tunity to discredit the witness's testimony as necessary. 34 An ac-
ceptable method of impeaching one's testimony is by showing "that
a witness has bias or prejudice toward one of the parties or has a
personal interest in the outcome of the case which can be expected
to color his testimony and undermine its reliability."3 5
A trial court may not properly require offers of proof with re-
spect to inquiries made during cross-examination except in unu-
27. See id. at 326.
28. See id. at 329.
29. Id. at 330.
30. See id. at 326.
31. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 923-24 (R.I. 1980) (citing Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
32. See id.
33. See Doctor 1, 644 A.2d at 1290 (citing R.I. Const. art. I, § 10).
34. See In re Douglas L., 625 A.2d 1357, 1360 (R.I. 1993) (citing Davis, 415
U.S. at 316).
35. Id. (quoting State v. Eckhart, 367 A.2d 1073, 1075 (R.I. 1977)).
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sual and peculiar circumstances. 36 Counsel often cannot know in
advance what pertinent facts he or she will elicit on cross-examina-
tion. For that reason, cross-examination is necessarily explora-
tory, and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of
his or her inquiry does not apply.37 In a fair trial, the cross-exam-
iner must have reasonable latitude, even though he or she is un-
able to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-
examination might develop. 38
The scope of cross-examination is within the trial judge's dis-
cretion.3 9 A trial judge has the discretion to limit cross-examina-
tion once there has been sufficient cross-examination to satisfy a
defendant's confrontation rights.40 In addition, the trial judge can
exclude irrelevant evidence, even if it purports to show bias.41 The
trial judge will halt a fishing expedition on cross-examination
when it becomes obvious that the pond is devoid of fish.42
ANALYSIS
The defendants suggested that Strong was aware of a civil suit
filed by Davis's mother, her sister, pursuant to the Criminal Inju-
ries Compensation Act.43 The defense theory was that Strong lied
when she denied knowing about that suit.44 At trial, the defense
counsel wanted to cross-examine Strong to show that Strong
thought that a conviction in the Doctors' case was a prerequisite to
her sister's recovery in the civil suit.45 However, the trial judge
36. See Calci v. Brown, 186 A.2d 234, 236 (R.I. 1962).
37. See State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 551 (R.I. 1982) (citing Alford v.
United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931)).
38. See id.
39. See State v. Crescenzo, 332 A.2d 421, 427 (R.I. 1975).
40. See State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 657 (R.I. 1987) (citing State v. Burke,
522 A.2d 725, 733 (R.I. 1987)).
41. See State v. Veluzat, 578 A.2d 93, 95 (R.I. 1990).
42. See State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 657 (R.I. 1987).
43. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-25-1 to 12-25-12.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) may be
cited as the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1972." R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-
25-1.1 delineates the transition to the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of
1996," established pursuant to § 12-25-16 through § 12-25-30. See 1996 R.I. Pub.
Laws, ch. 434, § 3.
44. See Doctor 1H, 690 A.2d at 326.
45. See id.
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pointed out that the language of the Compensation Act precludes
the necessity of a conviction before recovery. 46
Strong had denied any knowledge of that civil suit. The de-
fendants wanted to show that Strong did know of her sister's civil
suit, and additionally that she believed that the defendants' con-
victions were necessary for recovery in that suit. Defense counsel
opined that if proven, these facts could offer a sufficient basis for
Strong's less-than-truthful testimony. 47 The trial judge did not al-
low this cross-examination. Counsel for the defense posed this
question: "[Hias she communicated to you what, if anything, she's
going to do about this incident?... [Wihat she's going to do with-
about this case?"48 Strong answered, "no, I don't know." At that
point, the trial judge stopped defense counsel's further questioning
of the witness.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the defendants
had full opportunity to inquire about whether Strong had any
knowledge of her sister's civil action brought under the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act.49 The trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion by limiting further inquiry concerning the sister's pending
civil action.50 Strong had testified that she had no knowledge of
the matter. There was no point in continuing cross-examination
on that subject. 5 '
The supreme court suggested that, if defense counsel believed
he had not adequately exhausted his opportunity to explore for any
signs of bias in Strong, then he could have indicated to the trial
judge what he was pursuing.5 2 He could have made an offer of
proof pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 3
46. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-25-3(f) (providing in pertinent part that "[a]n order
may be made under this section whether or not any person is prosecuted or con-
victed of any offense arising out of the act").
47. See Doctor H, 690 A.2d at 326.
48. Id.
49. See Doctor 11, 690 A.2d at 327.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Rule 26(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides in pertinent part: "an action tried by a jury, if an objection to a ques-
tion propounded to a witness is sustained by the court, the examining attorney
may make a specific offer of what he or she expects to prove by the answer of the
witness."
1998] 445
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Defense counsel had informed the trial judge that the court
could not "require" him to make an offer of proof on cross-examina-
tion.54 In State v. DeBarros,55 the court held that a trial court may
not properly require offers of proof with respect to inquiries made
during cross-examination except in unusual and peculiar circum-
stances.56 In Doctor II, the supreme court explained that DeBarros
is not opposite Rule 26(b). Rule 26(b) permits offers of proof, but
does not mandate such offers.57 An offer of proof must be adequate
to indicate to the court that the subject matter was germane to the
issue of bias.58
In this case, if defense counsel made an offer of proof, then the
supreme court would be in a better position to determine whether
the trial judge abused his discretion in terminating defense coun-
sel's cross-examination. 59 The court could not review whether fur-
ther cross-examination on bias was indicated because there was no
record of where the questioning was going to lead.60 If defense
counsel had alerted the trial judge to information otherwise not
available to him, then he might have allowed the cross-examina-
tion to continue. Defense counsel could have requested a sidebar
conference to preserve his offer of proof for later review.61 Absent
that offer of proof, the supreme court was unable to perceive any
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's ruling. 62
CONCURRENCE
Chief Justice Weisberger did not agree with the majority's im-
plied criticism of the doctrine enunciated in State v. DeBarros. He
believed that any erosion of DeBarros was unnecessary to sustain
the evidentiary ruling of the trial judge in this case.63 Rule 26 does
not discuss offers of proof on cross-examination. The language of
the rule is general, and should properly apply to direct examina-
54. See Doctor 11, 690 A.2d at 328.
55. 441 A.2d 549 (R.I. 1982).
56. See id. at 551 (citing Calci v. Brown, 186 A.2d 234, 236 (R.I. 1962)).
57. See Doctor II, 690 A.2d at 327.
58. See DeBarros, 441 A.2d at 551.
59. See Doctor II, 690 A.2d at 327.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 331-32 (Weisberger, C.J., concurring).
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tion.64 If a trial judge believes that a subject has been exhausted,
then it is appropriate to seek guidance from counsel concerning the
goal of further examination. This query is different from an offer of
proof, which the chief justice would not require on cross-
examination. 65
CONCLUSION
The scope of cross-examination is not unlimited: "Where a de-
fendant seeks in cross-examination to open up new avenues of in-
quiry concerning the motive of a third party.., the trial judge may
properly exclude such evidence.. . , absent an offer of proof by the
defendant. ... "6 Ordinarily, offers of proof during cross-examina-
tion are not required. However, Rule 26(b) of the Rhode Island Su-
perior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure permits an attorney to
make an offer of proof in any instance where the judge sustains an
objection to his question. 67 In a trial where the judge prevents de-
fense counsel from continuing further cross-examination of a wit-
ness, an offer of proof would preserve the record for later review.
Vicki J. Ray
64. See id. at 331.
65. See id. at 332.
66. See State v. Brennan, 526 A.2d 483, 488 (R.I. 1987) (quoting State v.
Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 825 (R.I. 1980)).
67. See State v. Crescenzo, 332 A.2d 421, 427 n.1 (R.I. 1975).
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Criminal Law. State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310 (R.I. 1997). Under
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b), in a prosecution for child-
molestation sexual assault, the victim's testimony of uncharged
acts committed against her is admissible to show the defendant's
"lewd disposition" toward the victim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In State v. Gomes,l a jury convicted the defendant, Ernest
Gomes (Gomes), of sexually molesting his granddaughter, Fran
Doe.2 Gomes began molesting Fran when she was five-years old
and continued until she was eleven-years old.3 The first instances
of abuse occurred at Fran's grandparents' house where Gomes
would make Fran watch pornographic movies and dance for him,
initially clothed and later unclothed. 4 When Fran was seven-years
old, Gomes forced her to "manually stimulate him and perform fel-
latio on him."5
Gomes later separated from his wife and moved in with Fran
and her mother, Carol Doe.6 At this time, the assaults on Fran
continued regularly.7 When Fran was about nine-years old, her
family, including Gomes, moved to a new house in Providence,
Rhode Island.8 Two of the incidents for which the State charged
Gomes occurred at this new residence. During one incident, the
defendant coerced Fran to perform oral sex on him. In the other
instance, the defendant forced Fran to have sexual intercourse
with him.9 Soon after, Carol Doe fought with Gomes over another
matter and ceased having contact with him.10
At age fourteen, Fran began having problems with her mother
and was later placed in a Department of Children, Youth, and
Families (DCYF) residential treatment program." While there,
1. 690 A.2d 310 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 312 (stating that Fran Doe is a fictitious name).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 313.
6. See id. (stating that Carol Doe is also a fictitious name).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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she revealed her grandfather's molestation to a social worker and
then informed her mother.12 The abuse was not reported to police
until Fran was seventeen-years old.13
The grand jury was presented with the charges and returned
true bills on five counts of child-molestation sexual assault. 14 The
jury returned guilty verdicts on two counts of first-degree child-
molestation sexual assault and one count of second-degree child-
molestation sexual assault. 15 The trial judge denied the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial.' s The defendant appealed, arguing
that the testimony of the victim concerning uncharged sexual acts
committed by the defendant was improperly admitted in light of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Quattrocchi. 17
BACKGROUND
Under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of prior
bad acts is not admissible to show that the accused acted in con-
formity with those bad acts at the time in question. Rule 404(b)
reads:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or
12. See id.
13. See id. at 312.
14. See id.
15. See id. Before trial, one charge was dropped because of a statute-of-limita-
tions problem. See id. Due to a lack of evidence, another count, involving digital
penetration, was dismissed after the State rested. See id. at 313.
16. See id. at 313.
17. See id. at 316-17; see also State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996).
The defendant also argued that potential jurors should have been questioned indi-
vidually and outside of the presence of others, when asked their personal experi-
ence with sexual abuse or molestation. See Gomes, 690 A.2d at 314. The judge
asked the jurors whether "the subject matter or personal experience make it im-
possible for them to be impartial." Id. at 316. The court ruled that individual voir
dire was not required because the way in which the trial judge combined the two
questions allowed the jurors to ask to be dismissed without feeling embarrassed.
In fact, ten jurors did ask to be dismissed; therefore, individual questioning may
have been more intimidating. See id.
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to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and
that the fear was reasonable.18
The listed exceptions are examples and "are neither mutually
exclusive nor collectively exhaustive." 19 Some courts have recog-
nized another exception, sometimes called the "lewd" or "lustful-
disposition" exception.20 Under this exception, during a sexual-of-
fense trial, courts allow evidence of prior sexual misconduct into
evidence to show the lustful disposition of the accused toward the
victim.21 Evidence of prior sexual acts is often used with a young
victim to show the propensity of the accused to abuse children sex-
ually.2 2 Some state courts allow testimony of prior sexual acts by
the accused on a third party to come into evidence. 23
In State v. Jalette,24 the State intended to introduce testimony
of the victim's mother concerning prior uncharged acts of child mo-
lestation committed by the defendant against the victim. 2 5 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Kelley,26 stated:
(1) evidence of other not too remote sex crimes with the par-
ticular person concerned in the crime on trial may be intro-
duced to show the accused's 'lewd disposition or ... intent'
towards the person, (2) evidence that the accused committed
nonremote similar sexual offenses with persons other than
the victim may be admitted to prove the presence of the tradi-
tional exceptions to the general rule, such as intent or motive,
with a caveat that evidence of other acts with other persons
may be shown on the issue of intent only if it is absolutely
necessary, such as instances in which the accused admits the
act but claims that it was an accident or a mistake, and (3)
18. R.I. R. Evid. 404 (b).
19. John William Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence, § 190, at 799 (4th ed.
1992).
20. 1A John H. Wigmore, Evidence, § 62.2, at 1335 (Tillers Rev. 1983). Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 413 through 415 now incorporate this exception by allowing,
in cases of sexual assault and child molestation, evidence of prior acts of sexual
misconduct on any matter which the prior act is relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 413-15.
21. See Wigmore, supra note 20, at 1335.
22. See Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Dis-
position Exception, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 515, 526-27 (1995).
23. See Wigmore, supra note 20, § 62.3 at 1348.
24. 382 A.2d 526 (R.I. 1978).
25. See id. at 528-29.
26. 424 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1967).
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any doubt as to the relevancy of such evidence should be re-
solved in favor of the accused.27
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that, although prior
acts are generally not admitted to show action taken in conformity
with these acts, "there has been a marked tendency to admit this
type of evidence for precisely this purpose in cases involving sexual
offenses."28 The court also said that "lilt is generally recognized
that courts have extended a greater latitude of proof as to like oc-
currences when considering sexual offenses than has been permit-
ted in the trial of other criminal charges."29
This type of evidence is subject to three restrictions. First, the
prosecution should use evidence of other acts sparingly and "only
when reasonably necessary."30 The court should not admit the evi-
dence if it is "purely cumulative and not essential to the prosecu-
tion's case."31 Second, the admissibility of other-acts evidence is
limited to cases where it is "relevant to proving the charges lodged
against the defendant."32 Finally, the trial judge should give an
appropriate limiting instruction, designating "with particularity
the specific exception to which the evidence is relevant."33 In State
v. Cardoza,34 the exception was "extended to cover testimony by
the victim concerning uncharged acts."35
Five years after Jalette, in State v. Pignolet,36 the court ex-
tended the exception by allowing the victim's sister to testify to
three attempted assaults on her by the defendant.37 All but one of
the attempted assaults took place during the same time frame as
the assaults against the victim. 38 The court allowed the testimony
27. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 465 A.2d 200 (R.I. 1983).
35. Id. at 203. The court also allowed into evidence prior acts of sexual mis-
conduct with the sister of the complaining witness. See id.; see also State v. Messa
542 A.2d 1071 (R.I. 1988) (allowing evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct
which happened a year prior to the act charged with a victim who was not named
in the complaint).
36. 456 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983).
37. See id. at 180.
38. See id.
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to come into evidence and stated that the evidence tended to show
the "defendant's lecherous conduct toward[s]" the young victim.3 9
In Pignolet, the extension of Jalette to sexual conduct of the
defendant with another victim was warranted where "the un-
charged conduct is so closely related in time, place, age, family re-
lationships of the victims, and the form of the sexual acts."40 The
court emphasized that both children lived in the same house, were
sisters and were both being abused by their stepfather.41
Thirteen years later, in State v. Quattrocchi,42 the court held
that testimony of two prior uncharged sexual acts, committed
against witnesses not related to the victim, was improperly admit-
ted under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b).43 Explaining its
decision, the court stated the holding in Pignolet "represented the
extreme beyond which we are unwilling to extend the other-
crimes-or bad-acts-exception."" Evidence of prior sexual acts is
highly prejudicial. The jury is likely to view the defendant as a bad
person who has done this before and "therefore, probably commit-
ted the offense with which he is charged."45 The Quattrocchi court
held that the testimony of the other sexual incidents was improp-
erly admitted, under both Rule 404(b) and the court's decisions in
Jalette and Pignolet, because no family relation existed between
the victim and the witnesses.46
39. Id. at 182.
40. Id. at 181.
41. See id. at 181-82.
42. 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996).
43. Id.; see also R.I. R. Evid. 404(b). The prosecution presented evidence of
two incidents of uncharged sexual encounters against the defendant. See Quat-
trocchi, 681 A.2d at 887. The first incident involved the defendant's goddaughter
Lydia, and took place in the summer of 1977 when Lydia was seven-years old. See
id. at 885. Lydia testified that while she was showering after a swim, the defend-
ant, naked, walked into the bathroom, and he let her leave only after Lydia
threatened to scream. See id. The second incident involved Claudia, a family
friend, who accused the defendant of rubbing her breast. See id. Scared, Claudia
ran out into the street where she found a police officer who arrested the defendant.
The case was presented to a grand jury, which returned a finding of "no true bill."
Id.
44. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886; see also State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d 1000,
1004-05 (R.I. 1985) (holding that Pignolet was "limited to situations in which the
testimony of siblings of tender years was necessary in order for the state to meet
its burden of proof")
45. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 886.
46. See id. at 887. Justice Flanders dissented, stating that the distinction
made in Pignolet was not a sensible one. See id. at 890-91 (Flanders, J., dissent-
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ANALYsis AND HOLDING
In Gomes, responding to a motion in limine filed by the defend-
ant, the prosecution argued that the uncharged incidents of sexual
abuse were "necessary to show a special relationship between
[Fran] and the grandfather."47 The evidence was relevant to show
"a common scheme on the part of defendant to abuse the special
relationship he had with his granddaughter."48 Defense counsel
argued that it was merely cumulative and therefore should not be
admitted. The trial judge admitted the testimony as tending "to
show defendant's common design and plan in respect to the victim
and that it was relevant in that it showed his attitude regarding
sexual activity with the victim." 49
The defense argued that Quattrocchi had "cast doubts on the
rule of Jalette."50 The court stated Quattrocchi concerned testi-
mony regarding uncharged sexual acts against a witness other
than the victim, not uncharged acts committed against the vic-
tim.51 In Quattrocchi, the court was unwilling to extend the lust-
ful-disposition exception to include witnesses who lived outside the
victim's household.52 The court stated that "[n]othing in our opin-
ion in Quattrocchi casts doubt upon the use of other-acts testimony
to show a lewd disposition toward the victim herself."53
The court next looked at the three criteria set down in Jalette
to decide if the testimony here was properly admitted. The trial
judge found the evidence necessary, not cumulative, and relevant
to the prosecution's case. 54 The trial judge also "listed the specific
uses for which the evidence was being admitted" and gave to the
mng). Instead, he reasoned that the admissibility of the prior acts should be deter-
mined by the relationship between the defendant and his victim. See id. at 892.
Instead of using an unsound distinction, Justice Flanders stated that the evi-
dence should be admitted to show the defendant has a lewd disposition "toward a
certain class of persons of which the complaining child witness is a member." Id. If
the exception is going to be used, then "it does not appear to me to be a great leap
beyond these already existing exceptions to permit the introduction into evidence
of the defendant's sexual assault of one or more of his godchildren or, for that mat-
ter, of any other young girl in his or his family's circle of acquaintances." Id.
47. Gomes, 690 A.2d at 316.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 317.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
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jury an appropriate limiting instruction.65 The court held that the
trial judge "adhered closely" to the three restrictions set forth in
Jalette.56 Appropriate limitations were given for the admission of
the testimony of the uncharged acts. Therefore, they were properly
admitted under both Jalette and Quattrocchi.
CONCLUSION
Gomes clarifies the intended uses for uncharged sexual acts
committed against the victim and which limitations apply. Quat-
trocchi showed the concerns of the court in allowing evidence of
prior acts to be presented in a case involving sexual abuse. Quat-
trocchi did not dispose of the "lewd-disposition" exception, but lim-
ited its use to cases where a family relation exists between the
victim and the witness. In Gomes, the court set the limits for the
admission of testimony of prior sexual acts while also making it
clear the exception was still viable.
Lisa M. Kolb
55. Id.
56. Id. at 316.
